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FINANCIAL MOTIVES FOR
CONGLOMERATE GROWTH
ABRAHAM J. BRILOFF*
In a recent article in the Financial Analysts Journal, Leonard M. Savoie,
the Executive Vice President of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, observed that:
The major problem area confronting the Accounting Principles Board
in 1969 is business combinations . . . . The current wave of business
acquisitions and mergers could not have taken place without tax laws
permitting tax-free exchanges and the almost complete freedom of manage-
ment to choose between purchase accounting and pooling-of-interests
accounting.1
One cannot now be certain whether Mr. Savoie intended this observa-
tion to serve as a mea culpa for the Board, the Institute, or himself. I
nevertheless agree that the accounting profession's laxity in imposing stricter
standards of accountability on our major corporations has undoubtedly
sparkplugged and then accelerated the current merger movement, which,
from all indications, is destined to be the greatest such movement in history.
One might well ask what took the Board and others in our "Accounting
Establishment" so long to sense the social and economic consequences of
the profession's accommodation to the pioclivities of the merger-magnates?
The handwriting was on the wall years ago, written large so that all could
see- if only they would have looked.
One might also ask whether a profession, whose primary mission is that
of historian for corporate society, should have permitted its precepts and
practices to become sufficiently flabby and flexible to permit those who are
the very subject of the presumptively objective and truthful narrative, i.e.,
the professional managers of corporate society in whom such huge pools of
power have been vested, to have "almost complete freedom" to choose the
manner in which the epic narrative would be written.
THE ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION FOR BUSINESS COMBINATIONS
There is little question that the economics-of-scale argument can be
made in some cases; surely, if a computer has idle time it might be able to do
the job for a nexus of corporations as well as for a single entity. Similarly, if
incredibly ingenious management can mastermind cost-efficiency relation-
ships in the case of automobile manufacturing, there is no reason why it
should not be able to do the same for airplane manufacturing, typewriter
* Professor of Accountancy, The Bernard M. Baruch College of the City University
of New York. B.B.A., The City College, 1937; M.S., The City College, 1941; Ph.D., New
York University School of Business Administration, 1965; CPA (New York).
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872
FINANCIAL MOTIVES
production, or a distillery operation. The management mystique may lie in
its ability to interpret the print-out from the computer and to inspire asso-
ciates or disciples to implement the decisions of this group-think-tank. And
since our advancing technology permits centralized and coordinated manage-
ment to obtain instantaneous feedback on anything that is going on any-
where in the world, if not the universe, then such management should be
able to coordinate action and activate decisions on a ubiquitous scale with
the same pace and energy that our forebears exercised to operate the local
carriage or bicycle shop. In brief, advancing technology permits a corre-
sponding leap in geographic distances. Further, our decision-making models
have increasingly been committed to quantification, almost to the exclusion
of the qualitative (so that if that which is important cannot be quantified,
we will make important that which is quantifiable); as a result, management
has the expertise to make decisions about varied activities, even where it
does not have the apperceptive basis for fully comprehending what a partic-
ular decision involves.
Thus, management may be seen to be both ubiquitous and omniscient
- and if only it were also benevolent it would possess all the qualities
attributed to the Deity; and some of the "Merger Kings" would begin to
fancy themselves, if not exactly Divine, at least of Divine Origin and In-
spiration. But in all seriousness, there is clearly an argument to be made for
economics of scale.
MANAGERIAL COMPLACENCY AND ARROGANCE
Similarly, there is no question that traditional managements were often
both complacent and arrogant. They read too much of Galbraith and pre
umed that as long as they provided the shareholders with a nice, moderate
yield on their investment and a nice, proper growth curve (consistent, say,
with the growth in GNP or the industry generally), the shareholders would
not complain. And if, in the pursuit of these objectives, traditional manage-
ment permitted excess reserves to accumulate, and thereby produced a con-
servative balance sheet,2 why should the shareholders object? And, as every-
one knows, if the nice normalized income curves and the proper conservative
balance sheet could be achieved without taking undue risks, why take them?3
Again, Galbraith made clear that management's reward for accomplishment
is not nearly symmetrical with punishment for failure. If shareholders at
their "annual rites" raised objections to what management was doing, they
could "lump it"; the microphones would be shut off and the meeting ad-
2 This could be accomplished by depreciating properties far beyond their economic
wear and tear, suppressing inventories by the use of LIFO, or writing off natural re-
source exploitation costs, and expensing currently all tools, research and development
expenses, etc.
3 It should be noted that our profession's body of principles and practices greatly
facilitated traditional management's objectives of achieving that nice, slow growth curve,
and producing a correspondingly safe, conservative balance sheet.
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journed. And if they persisted in creating unrest, the next annual meeting
could be held in Maine during the month of February- or some other
natural punishment could be contrived. However, the recent merger move-
ment did produce a new Damoclean phenomenon for management-
namely, the take-over bid. Traditional management could no longer treat
their shareholders with disdain. The threat of the take-over bid has en-
couraged a greater degree of participatory democracy in our corporate
society, just as it has encouraged management to bring to the surface of the
balance sheet the pools of asset values which they heretofore preferred to
suppress.
OF CHARISMA AND SYNERGISM
To sum up the first thrust of this presentation, the merger managers
were supposed to bring the qualities of charisma and synergism into the
amalgamation. Through their youth and vigor, and their ability to eliminate
accumulated fat, duplication, and other wasteful patterns of business activity,
they were supposed to make two plus two equal five. And to prove it, take-
over bids carried market-price tags giving the shareholders of the target com-
panies stock profits beyond their dreams of avarice. Then, the "Merger
Kings" would fulfill their prophecies and projections by producing income
statements and balance sheets which were felicitous beyond anything seen
heretofore. This felicity, in turn, added to the god-like aura of the King,
permitting him to bring still more subjects under his spell and into his
realm. And as he did so, the values attributed to the currency generated by
the Merger King's printing presses (sometimes called "funny money") were
further increased, making this currency even more valuable in future take-
over negotiations, making more traditional managements quake, and so on
ad infinitum.
What are the accounting problems which we have confronted in trying
to fathom the effectiveness of the managements of our conglomerate com-
plexes? To begin with, the fact that they generally report their operations
on a smorgasbord or consolidated basis prevents us from determining just
how much better they are really faring than their predecessors - or even if
they are faring better. The consolidation permits a subsidy-effect to prevail,
whereby especially profitable operations can obfuscate adverse operations in
other areas. It is only when a combination of perverse factors converge at a
particular time that the outsider can gain an insight into the internal diffi-
culties. Such a convergence of perversity seems to have occurred, almost by
coincidence, during the past year for a number of our leading conglomerates,
including such giants as LTV, Litton, Automatic Sprinkler, and Gulf &
Western. In fact, this process of obfuscation has prompted one cynic to ob-
serve that he could not discern how much "syn" and how much "gism" were
subsumed in synergism.
This camouflaging consequence of the consolidation process has received
FINANCIAL MO TI VES
critical notice from Congress, the Justice Department, and both the Federal
Trade and Securities and Exchange Commissions. In response to such pres-
sure, the Financial Executives Institute, through its Research Foundation,
undertook a study to develop guidelines for financial reporting by diversified
companies. Relying on this study, which was pursued with diligence by
Professor R. K. Mautz, as well as on their own analyses, the SEC announced
proposed amendments to the Commission's reporting requirements. 4 As a
result, companies are now required to report sales and net income by lines of
business, whenever any such lines comprise at least 10 percent of the corpo-
ration's revenues or income. This change is, of course, in the right direction.
However, both the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
and the staff of the Cabinet Committee on Price Stability have com-
mented critically on this proposal; the former believes the 10 percent
test to be "overly detailed and of questionable value," whereas the latter
group contends that the new disclosure rules will still not reveal enough,
especially since they could require even less disclosure as the conglomerate
expands.
THE POOLING -PURCHASE DICHOTOMY
Far more dramatic and even more controversial is the accounting
dichotomy alluded to by Mr. Savoie, i.e., the pooling versus purchase con-
troversy. Briefly stated, these are the two alternatives described by the AICPA
over a decade ago in Accounting Research Bulletin 48 (hereinafter ARB 48).
The distinction between the two alternative methods of viewing business
combinations must "be found in the attendant circumstances." The stand-
ards for this accounting duality are then "fleshed out" as follows:
3. For accounting purposes, a purchase may be described as a business
combination of two or more corporations in which an important part
of the ownership interests in the acquired corporations is eliminated
or in which other factors requisite to a pooling of interests are not
present. 5
4. In contrast, a pooling of interests may be described for accounting
purposes as a business combination of two or more corporations in
which the holders of substantially all the ownership interests in the
constituent corporations become the owners of a single corporation
which owns the assets and businesses of the constituent corporations
... and in which certain other factors . . . are present. 6
Some of the "certain other factors" described by ARB 48 are:
5. When the shares of the stock that are received by the several owners
of one of the predecessor corporations are not substantially in propor-
tion to their respective interests in such predecessors, a new ownership
or purchase of the predecessor is presumed to result. Similarly, if the
4 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4988 (July 14, 1969).
5 AICPA, Business Combinations, ARB Op. No. 48 (1957).
6ld. at 4.
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relative voting rights, as between the constituents, are materially
altered . . . a purchase may be indicated. Likewise, a plan or firm
intention and understanding to retire a substantial part of the capital
stock issued to the owners of one or more of the constituent corpora-
tions, or substantial changes in ownership occurring shortly before or
planned to occur shortly after the combination, tends to indicate
that the combination is a purchase.7
Various attendant circumstances which would contaminate the pool are
also set forth:
a. Abandonment or sale of a large part of the business of one or more of
the constituents.
b. If the management of one of the constituents is eliminated or its in-
fluence upon the over-all management of the enterprise is very small.
c. Where one of the constituent corporations is clearly dominant (for ex-
ample, where the stockholders of one of the constituent corporations
obtain 90 to 95 percent or more of the voting interest in the combined
enterprise).8
In view of all that has been written about this controversy during the
past year, even the less sophisticated observer should now realize that even if
each of these logical standards for pooling had been violated in a particular
case, the corporate management could still utilize the "pooling" technique.
Thus, even if it is assumed that the exotic kinds of securities issued on the
swap destroyed the relative shareholdings and "shareholder-power;" that the
shareholders of the acquired corporation had explicitly been permitted to
dispose of their interest in the combined enterprise; that substantial seg-
ments of the acquired properties and managements had been disposed of;
that the interest of the acquired corporation in the combined enterprise was
measurable only in the third or even fourth decimal; and that the acquisi-
tion had been deemed to be a taxable purchase; the combination could still
be presented in the resultant financial statements as a pooling-of-interestsl
Why this proclivity for pooling? Essentially, it is because ARB 48 set
forth the following accounting dichotomy:
8. When a combination is deemed to be a purchase, the assets acquired
should be recorded on the books of the acquiring corporation at cost,
measured in money, or, in the event other consideration is given, at
the fair value of such other consideration or at the fair value of the
property acquired, whichever is more clearly evident. This is in
accordance with the procedure applicable to accounting for purchases
of assets.9
9. When a combination is deemed to be a pooling of interests, a new
basis for accountability does not arise. The carrying amounts of the
assets of the constituent corporations . . . should be carried forward.10
7Id. at 5.
8Id. at 6.
9 Id. at 8.
10 Id. at 9.
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POOLING DYNAMICS EXEMPLIFIED
One might well ask how pooling accounting has been utilized to pro-
duce extraordinary earnings injections for the acquiring corporation. Let us
consider briefly the 1967 acquisitions by Gulf & Western, with particular
emphasis upon its acquisition of Paramount Pictures. In its 1967 statements
Gulf &c Western asserted that its earnings had more than doubled- from
$22 million the previous year to $46 million. While this was certainly dra-
matic, supplemental data furnished by the report were even more euphoric.
They revealed that companies acquired during 1967 contributed a whopping
$22 million to the conglomerate's 1967 income, although these companies
had earned only $2.6 million during 1966.
Whether this extraordinary increase in earnings was attributable to the
special brilliance and genius of Gulf c Western's management depends on
how one defines brilliance and ingenuity. The enormous profit inflation was
triggered by Gulf Sc Western's wholesale disposition of television rights to
the Paramount Pictures library. Gulf & Western simply disposed of prop-
erties which they had acquired in the acquisition of Paramount.
By using the pooling-of-interest method of accounting, the conglomerate
was able to pay out over $184 million for its 1967 acquisitions, while reflect-
ing only a cost of less than $100 million on its books. It accomplished this
by equating the cost of the 1967 acquisitions with the written down (or
written off) amounts shown on the books of Paramount and the other ac-
quired companies, i.e., $100 million. The other $84 million was free to be
used to bolster reported earnings and, as asserted above, a good part of it
was so used.
THE PSYCHEDELICS OF PURCHASE ACCOUNTING
In the intervening period, as a result of perceptive questioning by finan-
cial analysts, and especially because of an SEC policy statement in June
1968,11 acquiring corporations have manifested a certain timidity of going
into the pool, and have found that the sport of purchase accounting can be
even more exhilarating than the pooling-of-interests variety.
Writers on the subject, myself included, had made an invidious distinc-
tion between pooling and purchase accounting, implying that if the one was
evil, the other was benign. Consistent with this was the traditional wisdom.
We presumed (naively, as it turned out) that if an acquiring corporation
paying $49 million to acquire the securities of a book-publishing company
was required to account for this transaction as a purchase, then, consistent
with the standards of ARB 48, the $49 million would have been allocated to
cash and receivables (net of liabilities), to inventories, fixed assets, copyrights,
franchises, investments, and the like - all predicated on the fair market
values prevailing at the time of the acquisition. Thus, we had presumed that
11SEC Securities Act Release No. 4910 (June 18, 1968), in [1967-1968 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,567.
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the sum of the parts would equal $49 million, and that the amount attributa-
ble to each of the parts would be derived out of that aggregate sum.
Here we were proven to be wrong -grievously wrong. Thus, when Na-
tional General acquired Grosset &c Dunlap, it paid $49,215,000. Of that sum,
$33,049,000, approximately two-thirds of the purchase price, was charged to
an "excess of the cost of investment" account; and this account is nought but
goodwill spelled backwards. Only $16 million was charged up to the assets
taken over on the Grosset & Dunlap acquisition. In other words, the royalty
contracts, copyrights, franchises, and investments in the publishing com-
pany's subsidiaries will be carried into National General's accountings at
Grosset & Dunlap's cost of $16 million - not the real cost to National Gen-
eral of $49 million. And of course, National General's future income data
will be correspondingly enriched by this cost-suppression technique.
THE PURCHASE-POOLING HYBRID
Let us next consider, however briefly, the hybridization experiment con-
ducted by Ling-Temco-Vought (LTV) when it acquired Wilson c Company.
There, LTV bought 53 percent of Wilson for cash and acquired the remain-
ing 47 percent for a new preferred-stock issue. The result was the "jackass"
- part purchase-part pooling. It was all-fooling, however, since, to all intents
and purposes, LTV ended up by taking over nothing more than Wilson's
vestigial book values for its inventories and other properties. The excess
paid by LTV on the 53 percent cash portion of the transaction was cozily
categorized as an "excess of cost account"; and that's something that will
never enter into the operating cycle of the Wilson operations. The 47 per-
cent acquired for the preferred stock was accounted for as a pooling, so that
the old book values were perpetuated here also.
To sum up this phase of our polemic, the pooling-purchase duality of
accounting methods was supposed to produce substantially divergent results.
In recent practice and in all too many important contexts, they have not
necessarily been divergent; the distinction has been severely blurred, and to
all intents and purposes, even eliminated.
Further, it has been emphasized that the accounting for business acqui-
sitions has enabled the acquiring company to suppress substantial amounts
of its costs and values, and then to bring these values to the surface in the
form of reported profits (which were nought but specious profits) of the
acquiring corporation. It is this fiction or speciousness which long gave to
the Merger Kings their myth of invincibility. Finally, in this context, let us
recall the point made by Mr. Savoie, to the effect that the selection of the
accounting alternative rests primarily with management. These factors com-
bined to produce the Emperor's charismatic and synergistic clothes which
were of the most gorgeous hues and of the most gossamer filament- but
only so long as the financial community wanted to go along with the decep-
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tion. And when the child discerns the Emperor's nakedness, the accounting
profession is cast in the role of the weaver.
MOVEMENTS TOWARD REFORM
Clearly then, there is disenchantment with the accelerated merger move-
ment of the recent past. It has artificially distorted the profit goals and ob-
jectives of shareholders, giving them visions of growth curves far beyond
those that could be developed by managements' blood, sweat, and tears, even
in a growing and thriving economy. This wave has, in turn, upset the profit
goals of our oligopolistic enterprise, inducing price increases which, in turn,
helped trigger the inflationary spiral and adversely affected our world
trade relationships.
Looking at the problem from the vantage point of an accountant, espe-
dally distressing is the realization that it was the very flexibility of our
precepts, in conjunction with the lack of a forthright posture of true inde-
pendence in practice, which made this merger wave possible in the first
instance. It is the realization that we gave our hallmark to statements which
were thereby presumed to be fair, but which were, as it now develops, mere
collages of numbers brought together within the framework of our loosely
defined, generally accepted accounting principles (or some unreasonable
facsimile thereof). This permitted the weaving of a web of deception in
which all too many of the 25 million shareholders have found themselves
ensnarled.
Also distressing is the realization that the profession of accountancy has
failed to recognize its responsibilities as a profession. Such a calling, we
know, is endowed by our society with rights, privileges and immunities, in
return for which we must accept a social responsibility. This responsibility
should have demanded our assuming the leadership in correcting accounting
gimmickry long before the present clamor for such changes.
And so we are pleased to believe that the conglomerate movement may
have passed its zenith, even though we know it is not yet near its nadir. More
importantly, we very much hope that from the major reappraisal occurring
within the government, the financial community, the realms of the profes-
sions, the groves of academe, and commerce and industry, there will emerge
a new and intensified commitment to a higher standard of fairness, truth,
justice and equity; that we will dedicate ourselves to the eradication of the
serious divergence between prevailing myth and underlying reality. Indeed,
this divergence, as well as the resultant credibility gap, must be eliminated
if our capitalistic institutions and our way of life are to be preserved.
